Transport Security Annual Report April 2010–March 2011

Presented to Parliament by the
Secretary of State for Transport,
by Command of Her Majesty
November 2011

£6.00

Contents

Foreword

As so often, the last year has again proved a busy and challenging one for the Department's security community. The national threat level has remained at 'SEVERE' (meaning an attack is highly likely) throughout the year and the discovery of an explosive device on board an aircraft at East Midlands Airport on 29 October 2010 demonstrated the continuing attractiveness of transport as a target for international terrorists. This report outlines what we have done during the year to respond to these emerging threats and to continue to protect the travelling public, transport infrastructure and those employed in the transport industries.

As the Government's recently published counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, makes clear, the UK faces a significant threat from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates, associated groups and terrorists acting on their own, as well as an ongoing and serious threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism. The incident at East Midlands Airport was a reminder that terrorists will seek to find and exploit vulnerabilities in the transport security system wherever they can.

From 2011 to 2015, one of the key objectives of the Government's CONTEST *Protect* workstream will be to reduce the vulnerability of the transport network, and we will be working closely with our colleagues in the Home Office and across Government to achieve this aim.

In order to develop effective, sensible and fully integrated policies that tackle these constantly evolving threats, close working with the relevant industries is vital. With this in mind, we have taken the decision to move away from a stand-alone security Directorate to a distributed transport security organisation, which will bring our modal security teams (e.g. for aviation, rail and maritime) alongside their non-security counterparts, to enable them to work more closely together and with the industry concerned.

Overall responsibility for transport security will now rest with my post, supported directly by a central Transport Security Strategy Division. A Transport Security Board will be established to co-ordinate security work across DfT and ensure that this is properly aligned with work across Whitehall.

These organisational changes will build on the Department's transport security expertise, built up over many years, while improving our ability to integrate this with the relevant policy areas across Government, and with industry, in response to increasingly sophisticated and complex types of attack.

Richard Hatfield
Director General – International, Strategy and Environment Group

1. Introduction

1.1   The Department for Transport (DfT) is the transport industries' security regulator. It devises and enforces security measures with due regard to their deliverability and proportionality, based on the nature and scale of the prevailing threat. Responsibility for delivering and paying for carrying out security measures rests with the regulated industries.

1.2   Our aim is to protect the travelling public, transport infrastructure and those employed in the transport industries – primarily from acts of terrorism – and to retain public confidence in transport security. We work closely with partner organisations, both from the wider Government counter-terrorism community and the transport industry, to deliver effective, proportionate and sustainable transport security.

1.3   The industries currently regulated are aviation, maritime, railways (including London Underground, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and Glasgow Subway), the Channel Tunnel and the movement of dangerous goods by road and rail. As the Regulator, the Department has responsibility for all modes of transport and operates both at home and overseas.

1.4   DfT ministers are directly accountable to Parliament for the security policies and programmes that the Department directs industry to implement.

1.5   This report provides details of our achievements throughout the year, which have included:

- delivering a joint review (with Home Office) of air cargo security and beginning work on delivering its recommendations;

- facilitating improvements in aviation security in key overseas locations;

- working towards the establishment of 28 Port Security Authorities;

- working to establish the new National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) at the Ministry of Defence's joint headquarters in Northwood;

- improving Channel Tunnel security measures to allow potential new services to operate through the Channel Tunnel and into the UK in a secure manner;

- providing security clearance services to the transport industry and beginning work on a security clearance modernisation programme;

- delivering a programme to ensure the security of the transport networks serving the London 2012 Olympic Games;

- directing an extensive research programme to explore new ways of effectively protecting the transport network; and

- continuing to assess and improve the compliance of the regulated transport industries with the security requirements placed upon them.

The threat picture

1.6   Al Qa'ida, Al Qa'ida affiliates, other terrorist groups and lone terrorists have all been active in the UK over the past two years. They have tried to conduct attacks, recruit people in the UK to conduct attacks overseas, raise funds and distribute propaganda.

1.7   For much of this period the greatest threat to the UK has come from terrorist groups based in Pakistan. But over the last year the threat to the UK and to UK interests from terrorists in Yemen and Somalia has significantly increased.

1.8   The threat level to the UK from international terrorism has been at SEVERE for much of the last year, meaning that the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) – the UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism – has judged a terrorist attack in the UK to be 'highly likely'.

1.9   The extent of the threat we face is reflected in the number of terrorist plots in this country and in related arrests, prosecutions and convictions. For example, between January 2009 and December 2010, there were 650 arrests in the UK on suspicion of terrorism (this figure includes arrests on suspicion of Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) which were made in the Republic of Ireland). There were more terrorist-related arrests in the UK than in any other European country over this period.

1.10   A significant amount of terrorist activity has traditionally been focused on transport. The attempted attack on an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 and the attempted attack on a cargo aircraft discovered at East Midlands Airport on 29 October 2010 serve as recent reminders that transport continues to be an attractive target to those intent on harming the UK and its interests.

Internal restructuring

1.11   While DfT is responsible for transport security policy and regulation, it is the UK transport industry that delivers the necessary security measures.

1.12   In order to develop effective, sensible and fully integrated policies that tackle increasingly complex types of attack, close working with the relevant industries is vital. To facilitate this, the Department has taken the decision to move away from a stand-alone security Directorate to a distributed transport security organisation, which will align DfT's modal security teams (e.g. for aviation, rail and maritime) with their non-security counterparts, to enable them to work more closely together and with the industry concerned.

1.13   A dedicated Transport Security Strategy Division will co-ordinate security matters across DfT and align them with the wider Government counter-terrorism strategy. It will retain responsibility for cross-modal policy, contingencies planning, and research, analysis and development work. The work of the Transport Security Strategy Division will be underpinned by a DfT

Transport Security Board, chaired by Director General – International, Strategy and Environment Group, to strengthen the coordination of transport security across the Department, recognising that there are many multi-modal issues – for example Olympic security.

1.14   On 23 May 2011 the Department security teams will move to this new structure, marking the end of a separate Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate.

1.15   There will be no changes to DfT's remit or responsibility regarding transport security: the Department retains its transport security focus and will continue its role in aligning transport security with the wider Government counter-terrorism strategy. The Department continues to be responsible for transport contingency arrangements in response to any actual or threatened disruption, and our aim remains to retain public confidence in transport security without imposing requirements that unduly impact on the way individuals travel.

Future reporting

1.16   During the passage through Parliament of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, ministers gave an undertaking that an annual report would be produced on the development and implementation of the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP). A similar undertaking was given for maritime security.

1.17   In recent years this reporting has been included in the Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC)'s Annual Report. In future, in order to rationalise reporting, we will instead incorporate any necessary transport security Parliamentary reporting into the Department for Transport's main Annual Report.

2. Aviation

2.1 The challenge of developing and employing systems capable of detecting liquid explosives in an operational environment, alongside the ability to detect artfully concealed conventional explosives material, continued to be the main focus of our project-based work in the first half of 2010/11. However, with the attempted attack on a cargo aircraft discovered at East Midlands Airport on 29 October 2010, the importance of ensuring that the air cargo security regime continued to be fit for purpose became an immediate and urgent priority.

2.2 Legislation at national and European level has also absorbed considerable time and effort since October. There has been a particular focus on cargo issues, requiring regular liaison with, and events for those in, the industry who will be responsible for delivering the new arrangements.

2.3 At this time of generally heightened threat level, the work undertaken by our international and European teams has become even more significant, as we continue to work with international partners, and through international standards, to develop consistent and responsive global security regimes to manage continually evolving threats.

Key achievements during the year

2.4 Key achievements during the past year have included:

- issuing a New National Aviation Security Programme to industry;

- reaching agreement with the European Commission (EC) to a trial of an alternative headwear screening process;

- making major steps forward with the US Transport Security Administration on security programmes for transatlantic cargo and mail;

- ensuring an appropriate immediate response to the cargo incident at East Midlands Airport, including new, time-limited restrictions on the carriage of certain articles;

- conducting immediate post-event discussions with industry to agree priorities for the domestic and international medium- and long-term response to the cargo incident;

- delivering a joint review (with Home Office) of air cargo security and starting work on delivering its recommendations;

- achieving European and international agreement, in principle, to the need to strengthen cargo security requirements, and working towards formal agreement on a new EC regime to deliver improvements to the security of inbound cargo;

- delivering enhancements to the UK cargo security regime;

- facilitating improvements to aviation security in key overseas locations;

- successfully introducing new arrangements in respect of the policing of airports, including through well-received regional training events;

- meeting performance criteria in respect of Parliamentary business and Freedom of Information requests; and

- delivering required efficiencies and savings in response to the Comprehensive Spending Review.

Working with the aviation industry

2.5   The Executive Committee (ExCo) of the National Aviation Security Committee (NASC) has met several times over the last year. It was formed to help the NASC focus on current security measures and to determine what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of State for Transport regarding future priorities. It has an independent chairman, with membership drawn from representatives of the airports and airlines, as well as Department for Transport (DfT), the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). It also provides strategic oversight and guidance to the operations sub-committee (OpsCom).

2.6   In the past year there has been a particular focus on the planned introduction of the screening of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) being carried by transfer passengers; cargo security; the aviation security policy framework; and Olympic aviation security issues.

Domestic regulation

2.7   For the first time, the regulated industry now has access to a consolidated version of EC and UK regulation on compact disc. The issue of the new National Aviation Security Programme was the culmination of a huge amount of work during the previous year that included, crucially and in the spirit of better regulation, the removal of a number of requirements that represented either unnecessary duplication or 'gold plating'.

2.8   Work has continued throughout the year to ensure that key elements of the programme are kept under review, in line with the direction provided by the ExCo and the OpsCom. Urgent regulation was drafted and issued in response to the cargo incident in October 2010.

2.9   Through its links with industry stakeholders, the regulation team has provided crucial support to the European and international teams in their respective negotiations concerning cargo security improvements.

2.10   We have also started to develop a new approach to aviation security regulation – one that is more outcome-focused and risk-based. This builds on the successful and similar approach to aviation safety as regulated by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). To seek views on this new approach we have developed a consultation with industry which will close on the 7 November 2011.

2.11   Furthermore, as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review it was agreed that, subject to legislation, certain aviation security functions currently undertaken by the Department for Transport would be transferred to the CAA. Having one body responsible for aviation safety and security compliance could offer efficiency savings through synergies of aviation security, safety regulation and compliance.

International

2.12   We have continued to focus and enhance our efforts, in conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), to provide technical assistance to countries where aviation security standards are in need of improvement. Through funding from the countering terrorism and radicalisation fund and our network of regional aviation security officers worldwide, we have assisted countries in North and East Africa, the Middle East and South Asia with training and equipment to enhance local security levels.

2.13   Following the October cargo incident, DfT led a thorough review of cargo security in key parts of the world. As a result, our efforts were focused on achieving improvements where necessary, in partnership with the FCO, host states and operators.

European engagement

2.14   We continue to be closely involved and actively participate in a variety of European Union (EU) forums, for example the EU Civil Aviation Security Regulatory Committee, which comprises EC and member states' security experts. The Committee develops the common basic standards and implementing rules for aviation security at EU airports.

2.15   The key focus this year has been in relation to a new European cargo security regime in the light of the incident at East Midlands Airport on 29 October 2010. We played a leading role in reaching agreement in principle on the need for a tighter European regime in respect of flights coming to Europe and are close to formal agreement on new rules that will deliver a step change in the security of air cargo entering EU airspace.

2.16   We have continued to press for the amendment of baseline aviation security regulations so that security scanners can be used as a primary technology for screening passengers in EU airports. At present they can only be used as a secondary form of screening. We believe that they offer a greater degree of assurance in the detection of low and no metal threat items and are hopeful of securing approval for their use as a primary means of screening early in 2011/12.

3. Maritime

3.1 Throughout the year, we have continued to adapt our maritime security regime to take account of new requirements and the evolving threat, and, through the working groups of the DfT's National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC), we are continuing to address a range of issues with our key stakeholders.

3.2 The attack on the M Star tanker in July 2010 led to the formation of a risk and response group to enable the rapid sharing of information between Government Departments and the shipping industry regarding any incidents where there is no direct UK involvement.

3.3 We have been working with the CPNI and the maritime industry to look at personnel security issues. The final output of this work will be guidance specifically tailored to the port industry.

3.4 Internationally, piracy continues to threaten commercial shipping lanes and, in the UK, we have been playing our part in ensuring the industry implements the Best Management Practices as the most effective self-protection measures. We have also started to review our policy on the use of armed guards on board UK flagged vessels.

3.5 We have continued to contribute to moves to improve co-ordination for maritime matters across Government departments and agencies through the Cabinet Office led Maritime Senior Oversight Group.

Port security regulations

3.6 The Port Security Regulations 2009 came into effect on 1 September 2009, transposing EU Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security.

3.7 The regulations provide for the implementation of the Directive, building on the robust maritime security regime at UK ports by improving governance and counter-terrorism security through the:

- establishment of Port Security Authorities;

- appointment of Port Security Officers;

- undertaking of Port Security Risk Assessments; and

- preparation of Port Security Plans.

3.8 The Port of Bristol Security Authority was the first such authority to be established in the UK, with the designation order for the authority coming into force on 19 March 2010.

3.9   Since then, the Department has been working towards the designation of a further 28 ports, with the possibility of additional ports being designated subject to a review of port facilities.

3.10   Preliminary discussions have already taken place with many of the ports concerned, and we anticipate that all of the ports within the scope of the directive will have been designated by the end of 2015.

3.11   The first of these ports, the Port of Dover, is currently passing through the regulatory clearance process, after which the designation order will be laid before Parliament.

3.12   We are providing regular reports to the European Commission on the progress of our implementation.

Piracy

3.13   Although piracy is not regarded as a terrorist matter because of its economic rather than political motivation, we take the UK's lead in developing ship protection policy.

3.14   The success of the combined military forces has reduced the number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden, but it has also resulted in piracy attacks being pushed further out into the Indian Ocean. There have also been reports of increased violence against captured seafarers. We have continued to lead on counter-piracy ship protection policy and have represented the DfT at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

3.15   We have also supported the work being done by others across Whitehall, and by the shipping industry, to tackle the problem. We have supported the view that the best method of minimising the risk of successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia is contained in the industry's own document *Best Management Practices*.

3.16   The UK's official counter-piracy guidance document, *Marine Guidance Note 420*, was updated and published. This version contains recently updated advice and guidance published by the IMO, and is fully aligned with Best Management Practices.

3.17   The NMSC counter piracy working group has recently reconvened to review the policy on the use of armed guards on board UK-flagged ships. Consultation with industry and others is taking place, and DfT will fully engage in discussions at the International Maritime Organization on this issue.

National Maritime Information Centre

3.18   Work to establish the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) based at the Ministry of Defence's joint headquarters in Northwood has continued, and the NMIC will be operational in April 2011.

3.19 The NMIC will bring together key agencies responsible for maritime safety, security and environmental protection. Based together in one centre, they will develop and monitor a coherent picture and shared understanding of maritime activity around the UK and its overseas territories. The involvement of DfT and Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is vital to this initiative and, once it is operational, MCA will have a permanent desk at the Centre.

4. Rail, light rail and metro

4.1 National rail light rail and metro networks are open to the free flow of passengers and goods in a way that international rail and the aviation sector are not. This presents challenges of its own and means that many aspects of the security regime take place behind the scenes.

4.2 Nonetheless we have continued throughout the year to keep our arrangements under review in order to ensure they meet the current level of threat and that they are proportionate as well as adaptable to changes in terrorists' methods.

Liberalisation of cross-Channel rail services

4.3 To allow potential new services to operate through the Channel Tunnel and into the UK in a secure manner, we have been actively working with French authorities (the co-owners of the Tunnel) to ensure that comparable security measures will be in place when new services commence.

4.4 During the year, Deutsche Bahn publicly announced its intention to operate a passenger service from Frankfurt and Amsterdam to London via Brussels by December 2013. A bi-national UK and French delegation was established to liaise with Deutsche Bahn officials and to provide advice on how they could achieve comparability with security measures already in place in the UK, France and Belgium. The bi-lateral delegation is actively engaged in regular discussion with Deutsche Bahn about the security measures for this proposed service and will, when appropriate, be meeting the authorities in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.

Maintaining existing rail and metro security

4.5 We continued throughout the year to work closely with the rail industry, including Network Rail and the train operating companies, to maintain and develop the National Railways Security Programme (NRSP). This has included working with the industry on various commercial initiatives to ensure appropriate standards of security are applied. We have continued to work with London Underground on a review of its security instructions and have maintained liaison with Docklands Light Railway as it moves towards formally opening the Stratford International Extension in autumn 2011.

4.6 We have maintained a watching brief on the Inquests into the 7 July 2005 attacks, in liaison with London Underground and the British Transport Police (BTP), and we will contribute to the overall Government's response to the Coroner's findings when these are published.

Passenger screening

4.7 The three-year DfT/BTP funded trial undertaken by the BTP, for the deployment of people-screening explosive-search dogs on the railway network was completed at the end of March 2011. The deployment of the trained dogs has enhanced current security measures and reduced unnecessary disruption to the travelling public by helping security staff respond to security alerts without closing stations. Participation in the trial has demonstrated to BTP the potential of the passive screening explosive-search dog, and BTP have agreed to continue to develop the capability. Senior BTP approval has been given to increase the number of dogs in readiness for the 2012 Olympics and beyond.

Vehicle restraints

4.8 We have continued to work in partnership with Network Rail, station developers and other public bodies to ensure that vehicle restraint measures are installed at key railway stations and that security measures are incorporated into the design phase of refurbishments or new-build stations.

International

4.9 The Department hosted the eighth session of the International Working Group for Land Transport Security (IWGLTS) on 23–25 March 2011. The event was attended by 28 representatives from 12 countries, the EC and the United Nations Economic Community for Europe (UNECE). The UK holds the Chairmanship of the International Working Group throughout 2011.

4.10 The Working Group sessions were based around the ongoing four work streams identified as priorities by IWGLTS: Mitigating Measures; Technology; Risk Assessment; and Public Awareness. The overall theme of the 2011 meeting focused on innovative security techniques. This allowed the UK, including key industry stakeholders and the British Transport Police, to share experiences and best practice on land transport security measures.

4.11 We have continued to participate in the European Commission's Urban Transport Security Group and to promote UK rail operator and BTP involvement in its various working groups.

5. Cross-modal security

5.1　Many of the security programmes in development in the Department have applications for all areas of the transport industry. Details of the latest work are given here.

Personnel security

5.2　We have moved further towards incorporating into transport practice the strands of work set in motion following an independent review of transport personnel security. Mode by mode, industry has been considering at a national level how to take these forward. For example, within the dangerous goods sector, thorough risk assessments and promulgation of best practice have been achieved in collaboration with industry trade bodies. This has led to increased awareness by industry operators of risks and what they can do to reduce them.

5.3　DfT Compliance Inspectors have continued to promote personnel security best practice within the transport industry, and DfT has continued to work with the CPNI to devise and deliver improved training materials and modules, for inspectors, on personnel security and insider threat issues.

5.4　We have continued to provide and improve security clearance services to the transport industry and are currently working on a security clearance modernisation programme. This Cabinet Office led cross-Government initiative will improve the way national security vetting is delivered to industry by collecting data electronically, providing better case management and a developing national database of clearances.

5.5　Online guidance to the industry and to individuals wishing to obtain security clearances has been refreshed, updated, expanded and improved.

Transport security for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games

5.6　DfT has been working closely with colleagues in the Home Office, police, Cabinet Office and Government Olympic Executive, amongst others, to ensure that transport security planning is well integrated within the wider Olympic Safety and Security programme.

5.7   Located in the Olympic Security Directorate's offices, a multi-agency transport security project team including DfT staff has been working to identify additional risk to the transport networks during the Olympics and to co-ordinate appropriate and proportionate mitigation measures. This work, together with a wider DfT programme of activity, has looked at how best to protect those transport networks which serve Olympic venues or will be used by Olympic visitors to enter or leave the UK, so that a person travelling during the Olympics is as safe and secure as someone using the transport networks today.

Transport of dangerous goods

5.8   Some of the substances that terrorists aspire to acquire are routinely shipped as dangerous goods across the transport network. Within the wider remit of facilitating trade, our programme of work has continued to ensure the secure transit of these goods, in order to prevent such acquisition.

5.9   Building on previous work to list very high-consequence dangerous goods, we have been working with industry and others to identify those substances that are of greatest concern in the context of counter-terrorism. Through a targeted programme of inspection, we have continued to ensure that carriers of these substances are aware of and are implementing best security practice.

5.10   We have published guidance this year on security training and personnel security, which will assist industry in implementing best practice and help ensure the safe and secure transport of dangerous goods.

Research, analysis and development

5.11   Over the past year, DfT's Research, Analysis and Development team have:

- directed an extensive research programme;

- ensured new security equipment meets required standards; and

- maintained links to industry, manufacturers, other Government departments and international partners.

Headwear screening

5.12   We have developed an effective alternative to hand-searching of religious headwear. We recognised that removing and putting on headwear can be a problem for both passengers and airport staff. We commissioned research into the use of trace detection and handheld metal detectors as alternative methods, and demonstrated in the laboratory their effectiveness. This process is now being trialled at several major airports, and we are assisting in the planning of covert testing to ensure that the process is equally effective when used in the operational environment.

Liquid Explosive Detection Systems (LEDS)

5.13 To aid decisions on the use of LEDS, a validated model of a security checkpoint was developed. The impact of allowing passengers to carry large liquids through airports again was unknown. To answer this question we commissioned a model of a typical security checkpoint and performed analysis on how different liquid screening technologies might be used. A three-week trial was conducted, with international collaboration from the US and Australia, to prove the model's accuracy. From this work we have provided evidence to underpin policy decisions.

Behavioural detection

5.14 Research is continuing to understand how behavioural detection can be used in transport security. There is scientific debate about whether behavioural cues can be used to identify terrorists and how best to deploy behavioural detection officers. We have commissioned research into whether trained CCTV operators and behavioural detection officers can use CCTV footage to spot terrorists.

6. Compliance

6.1   As a result of internal restructuring, the Transport Security Compliance Division was created on 7 June 2010, bringing together the three previously separated modal compliance teams, their management and support, into one division.

6.2   Having a single division has brought a sharper focus to compliance delivery, both by ensuring that priorities are met and compliance activity is focused on the right areas, and by maximising flexibility and strengthening links between the three modes.

6.3   Through a combination of overt and covert inspections, audits and tests, our risk-based compliance activity has continued to assess and improve the compliance of the regulated transport industries with the security requirements placed upon them. We have continued to take a stepped approach to compliance monitoring and enforcement, the aim being that, where deficiencies are identified, these are resolved in discussion with the operator concerned.

6.4   Compliance highlights this year have included:

- the roll-out of new technology to aviation inspectors and their management, which has:
    - improved the control over the business;
    - automated the scheduling of resources;
    - improved access to wider data; and
    - increased the speed of data input to the system;
- the implementation of the Port Security Regulations that involve the creation of Port Security Authorities; and
- the production of guidance for train operating companies and Network Rail on conducting in-house testing, which was well received.